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ABSTRACT
Historically, enterprise network reconnaissance is an active pro-
cess, oen involving port scanning. However, as routers and switches
become more complex, they also become more susceptible to com-
promise. From this vantage point, an aacker can passively iden-
tify high-value hosts such as the workstations of IT administrators,
C-suite executives, and finance personnel. e goal of this paper
is to develop a technique to deceive and dissuade such adversaries.
We propose HoneyRoles, which uses honey connections to build
metaphorical haystacks around the network traffic of client hosts
belonging to high-value organizational roles. e honey connec-
tions also act as network canaries to signal network compromise,
thereby dissuading the adversary from acting on information ob-
served in network flows. We design a prototype implementation
of HoneyRoles using an OpenFlow SDN controller and evaluate its
security using the PRISM probabilistic model checker. Our perfor-
mance evaluation shows that HoneyRoles has a small effect on net-
work request completion time, and our security analysis demon-
strates that once an alert is raised, HoneyRoles can quickly iden-
tify the compromised switch with high probability. In doing so, we
show that role-based network deception is a promising approach
for defending against adversaries that have compromised network
devices.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Enterprises heavily rely on the security of their networks. ese
networks oen consist of a wide variety of computing resources,
including desktops, laptops, servers, routers, and switches. e re-
sources support a range of activities by different types of users per-
forming actions as different roles (e.g., IT administrators, C-suite
executives, and finance personnel) [12]. By compromising one or
more of these resources, an adversary may cause significant harm
to the enterprise. For example, it may steal credentials or access
systems with the goal of exfiltrating sensitive information such as
intellectual property and customer information, or modifying data
such as source code repositories and payment systems.
e first phase of network infiltration is reconnaissance. Tra-
ditional reconnaissance techniques such as port scanning are ac-
tive, and the current state-of-the-art network defenses have be-
come highly tuned to identify them. However, passive reconnais-
sance by compromising packet forwarding devices and inspecting
network flows to identify the existence and behaviors of client
and server hosts is becoming increasingly feasible. Specifically, as
packet forwarding devices such as routers and switches become
more complex, they become more prone to compromise [18, 24,
75]. ese targets include emerging Soware Defined Networking
(SDN) switches, which provide much broader and more flexible
functionality [6, 9, 64, 69]. Prior solutions [51, 58] seeking to
defend against malicious forwarding devices are not directly appli-
cable for SDN devices [79]. Furthermore, SDN data plane defenses
mostly concentrate on forwarding verification and other active at-
tacks (e.g., packet delaying, tampering, dropping) [16, 25, 35, 43,
63].
e goal of this paper is to (1) deceive adversaries by perturb-
ing the network traffic information gained through passive recon-
naissance, and (2) dissuade an adversary from acting on observed
information (e.g., performing active reconnaissance or an aack).
We are particularly interested in protecting enterprise employees
acting in high-value roles such as IT administrators, C-suite exec-
utives, and finance personnel. Our vision is to build metaphori-
cal “haystacks” around the network activities of these individuals.
e introduced network traffic perturbs reconnaissance, and if the
adversary acts on the wrong intelligence, it will be detected with
high probability, which will in effect dissuade the adversary from
acting.
In this paper, we proposeHoneyRoles, which uses honey connec-
tions to deceive adversaries using compromised packet forwarding
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devices for passive reconnaissance. HoneyRoles coordinates honey
connections by modeling fake hosts that are organized into roles
corresponding to organizational functions of client hosts (e.g., IT
administrator workstations). HoneyRoles performs integrity val-
idation of honey connections such that they act as “canaries” for
aacks against network clients. In the event that an adversary
modifies or blocks a honey connection, HoneyRoles detects the
adversary’s existence and statistically identifies any compromised
forwarding devices.
We evaluate the security of HoneyRoles’ defender-aacker en-
vironment using a probabilistic model checker (PRISM [39]). is
simulation assumes an alert has been raised and measures the ac-
curacy of detecting the location of compromised switches. For
a simulated Fat-Tree network topology with 50 real and 50 fake
hosts and 1 compromised switch, we show that HoneyRoles consis-
tently ranks the compromised switch as most suspicious, regard-
less of the switch function (i.e., edge, aggregate, or core). In the
same environment with two compromised switches, we show that
HoneyRoles consistently ranks at least one of the switches as most
suspicious. e second compromised switch is also usually highly
ranked, depending on its function.
We additionally used Mininet to emulate the Fat-Tree topology
with 50 real and 50 fake hosts. When measuring the pairwise re-
quest completion time between real hosts and servers, we observed
that HoneyRoles has a small impact on network request comple-
tion time for a moderately loaded network (1 request per second
per host on average). With a thorough experiment, we have seen
that 90% of hosts observe less than 14% overhead in request com-
pletion time.
is paper makes the following contributions:
• We introduce role-based deception as an enterprise network
defense. HoneyRoles conceals the identity of critical client
hosts and creates uncertainty for an adversary residing in
one or more compromised packet forwarding devices.
• We use honey connections to deflect and detect en route ma-
nipulation of client network traffic. HoneyRoles uses statis-
tical inference to identify any compromised network de-
vice.
• We evaluate the security of HoneyRoles’s defender-aacker
environment using a probabilistic model checker. Honey-
Roles consistently tracks network events and successfully
ranks the switches in terms of suspiciousness.
e remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 mo-
tivates our work. Section 3 overviews HoneyRoles’s architecture
and major goals. Section 4 describes the design principles. Sec-
tion 5 provides a security analysis using a probabilisticmodel checker.
Section 6 evaluates performance overhead. Section 7 discusses lim-
itations. Section 8 overviews related work. Section 9 concludes.
2 PROBLEM
Targeted aacks [26, 42] and threats to enterprise network infras-
tructure [31, 53, 70] continue to increase. Such aacks oen begin
with a foothold for reconnaissance. Historically, footholds have
been client workstations. However, network packet forwarding
devices such as routers and SDN switches are becoming prime tar-
gets as they offer a valuable vantage point for reconnaissance and
their increased complexity leaves themmore prone to compromise.
Once a foothold is established, the adversary performs recon-
naissance to identify targets that most profitably support its goals
(e.g., to take over the account of an IT administrator or C-suite
executive). From the vantage point of a compromised network
switch, the adversary can perform various en route network traffic
aacks that strategically and selectively target high-value clients
at critical times. For example, it could inject malicious JavaScript
into Web pages as they are returned from Web servers, or it could
use SSL-stripping to eavesdrop on traffic and steal credentials. Ex-
isting defenses such as HSTS have seen limited deployment [37],
in part because many developers do not understand how to use
HSTS correctly, resulting in critical information such as login cook-
ies being leaked. For networks that include mobile devices, Luo et
al. [46] found that popular mobile web browsers failed to fully sup-
port HSTS and were le open to clickjacking aacks. Additionally,
Krombholz et al. [38] showed that TLS deployment is far too com-
plex, leading to large numbers of incorrect HTTPS deployments.
Other aacks include redirecting client traffic to malicious servers
or simply blackholing the traffic to keep a target from performing
a critical task (e.g., monitoring IDS logs). If done strategically and
sparingly, such manipulation can fall under the detection thresh-
olds of existing defenses [16, 25, 63].
Such aack activity can be broken down into three phases. (1) Pas-
sive reconnaissance: the adversary passively intercepts and tracks
the communications of different organizational entities to identify
the target roles’ probable locations. Other than forwarding col-
lected data for further analysis, the adversary does not leave a trace
for the defender to identify suspicious activity. (2) Active recon-
naissance: the adversary may perform a different type of active in-
terception for pinpointing the target and increasing the confidence
it has about the information. Such activities may be detected by
the defender; however, the adversary still does not disrupt com-
munication. (3) Active aack: the adversary has gained adequate
confidence for target systems and decides to aack a client’s net-
work traffic. Even if such activities raise an alarm, the adversary’s
location within the network may still be difficult to locate.
e three-phase aack plan described above demonstrates the
danger of reconnaissance as an important precursor to sophisti-
cated aacks. With information about the users, devices, and ser-
vices on a network it is possible to design an aack strategy that
minimizes the risk of detection. For example, armed with infor-
mation gathered passively, an adversary may realize its current
foothold is unable to contact a sensitive server without triggering
an alarm, resulting in it pivoting its foothold in the network to a de-
vice or user that can access the server. For this reason, it is crucial
to defend against network reconnaissance.
reat Model & Assumptions: e goal of the adversary is to iden-
tify high value targets, learn enterprise secrets (e.g., intellectual
property, customer data and credentials), and modify data en route
to high-integrity servers (e.g., soware code repositories, payment
systems). To do so, an adversary may target administrative sys-
tems, or connections to them, to gain access to target systems. We
assume the adversary is able to compromise one or more packet
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forwarding devices in the network. From the vantage point of a
forwarding device, the adversary can view, analyze, and modify
all packets that flow through it. We do assume that not all of the
forwarding devices are compromised, and that the defender can
incrementally replace or refresh devices as they are detected.
We assume the adversary has some, but not all knowledge of
the hosts in the network. For example, we assume the IP addresses
of important servers (e.g., Admin and Finance Servers) are known,
based on other available information (e.g., DNS information). How-
ever, we assume the adversary does not know the IP address and
other details of workstations that perform specific organization
roles (e.g., the IT Admin workstation). Additionally, by compro-
mising an SDN switch, the adversary has access to the SDN south-
bound network and hence can aempt to forge forwarding rules
(e.g., OpenFlow messages) in the corresponding switch. Finally, in
order to achieve its goals, the adversary seeks to remain undetected.
For example, if the defender identifies which SDN switch is com-
promised, it will replace the switch, and the adversary will lose its
foothold.
Our trusted computing base (TCB) includes the system defender
(SDN controller or a separate trusted server) and the southbound
network between the SDN controller and SDN switches. As such,
we assume the SDN switches are configured to either use out-of-
band communication, or in-band communication protected by TLS.
We do not blindly assume that SDN switches are trustworthy. Our
security analysis in Section 5 evaluates scenarios with one or two
compromised switches. Similarly, HoneyRoles trusts its host agents
running onworkstations and servers. Finally, we assume the topol-
ogy has a sufficient number of redundant forwarding paths for the
ease of dynamic path management, discussed in Section 4.
3 OVERVIEW
HoneyRoles seeks to use deception to mitigate the threat of com-
promised packet forwarding devices (e.g., switches and routers).
From the vantage point of a packet forwarding device, an adver-
sary can perform passive reconnaissance to identify high-value
client hosts (e.g., IT administrators, C-suite executives, and finance
personnel), active reconnaissance (e.g., selective probing or rerout-
ing), and perform en route traffic aacks (e.g., injecting content,
SSL-stripping, blackholing). Our vision is to introduce honey net-
work traffic that (1) deceives the adversary by building metaphori-
cal “haystacks” around the network activities of high-value client
hosts, and (2) dissuades the adversary from acting on information
in real network traffic for fear of being detected.
Achieving this vision requires overcoming the following research
challenges:
C1 (Detection): Compromised packet forwarding devices are
difficult to detect. An adversary performing passive moni-
toring will not produce detectable actions until it aempts
an aack (possibly months aer compromise), at which
point it may be too late to detect a compromise.
C2 (Exposure): e adversary may have knowledge of some
enterprise network components. Information fromDNS and
publicly accessible websites [49, 67] make hiding the iden-
tity of servers futile. Servers receive a disproportionate
amount of inbound connections, allowing an in-network
c1
c2
c3
c4
s1
s2
s3
s4
sw1
sw2
sw7
sw8
Core Network
sw3
sw4
sw5
sw6
SDN Controller
Real: Role 1 Role 2 Role 3
Fake: Role 1 Role 2 Role 3
Figure 1: Overview of HoneyRoles
adversary to distinguish between clients and servers, which
may limit the effectiveness of moving-target defenses [19,
59].
C3 (Visibility): e adversary may be aware of the deception
system. Naı¨vely sending honey traffic is not effective if
the adversary is aware of the defense. External events (e.g.,
stockmarket changes and DDoS aacks) can cause certain
high-value client hosts to act predictably.
Figure 1 overviews the high-level intuition behind HoneyRoles.
e figure depicts four client hosts (c1-c4) and four servers (s1-
s4) connected by a network topology with redundant links and
switches. A network administrator partitions each client host based
on organizational roles. In the figure, c1 is in Role 1, c2 is in Role
2, c3 is in Role 3. Host c4 is not assigned to any role. HoneyRoles
then installs soware agents (honey agents) on client hosts that
produce fake network traffic. Each client host is assigned at least
one honey agent, each of which is assigned one of the organiza-
tional roles. Some physical hosts may run multiple honey agents.
HoneyRoles uses hosts with honey agents to establish honey
connections with the real servers (e.g., SMTP, HTTP, FTP). Using
honey connections, honey agents establish new application-layer
protocol sessions with the servers (simply replaying network traces
would be detectable). HoneyRoles uses Soware-Defined Net-
working (SDN) to dynamically change the forwarding paths be-
tween client hosts (both honey and real) and servers. Each for-
warding path is selected randomly and applies to both real and fake
(honey) connections. Figure 1 shows two forwarding paths. e
blue path (c1-s1) containing real traffic avoids the compromised
switch (sw5), and the red path (c3-s1) containing fake (honey) traf-
fic passes through the compromised switch (sw5). Note that the
blue path could have just as easily passed through the compro-
mised switch. e goal of deception is to provide the adversary
with sufficient fake information such that it does not know what
information to believe. Furthermore, HoneyRoles’s honey connec-
tions act as canaries. If the adversary guesses wrong and performs
an en route traffic aack on a honey connection, HoneyRoles will
detect the adversary’s existence. If the adversary guesses wrong
enough times, HoneyRoles statistically identifies the compromised
forwarding device.
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HoneyRoles addresses theDetection challenge by increasing the
frequency at which a given compromised packet forwarding de-
vice will see network traffic that may be viewed by the adversary as
“valuable.” For example, a switch near client host c4 (Figure 1) may
not normally see network traffic to a domain controller. However,
honey connections from a honey agent on c4 provide the delusion
that domain controller traffic can go through that switch. In fact,
this design choice enables HoneyRoles to not merely overcome but
embrace the Exposure challenge. By not obfuscating the network
identities of high-value servers, HoneyRoles uses honey connec-
tions to them as bait.
HoneyRoles addresses the Visibility challenge through its use of
organizational roles to parameterize the creation of honey connec-
tions. For each role, an administrator specifies a role profile. e
profile defines: (1) the number of real hosts, (2) the identities of
the real hosts, (3) the number of honey agents, (4) the locations
and identities for the honey host agents, and (5) the set of target
servers S that are relevant to the role (e.g., domain controller and
HR server). HoneyRoles assumes the adversary would aempt to
identify target client hosts based on their connections to the high-
value servers. erefore, HoneyRoles monitors the network activ-
ity between real clients and high-value servers. It uses these traffic
paerns to automatically configure the honey host agents to send
honey connections to the target servers with similar request rates.
Assume there are r real client and h honey host agents in same
target role. Hence, the adversary has a r
r+h
chance of correctly
identifying a real client host. Note that acting on a wrong guess
has negative consequences for the adversary (i.e., detection).
Importantly, HoneyRoles does not provide any signal on detec-
tion (no change of strategy) toward the adversary, unless network
administrators reconfigure a compromised switch. Section 5 eval-
uates the resulting defender-aacker outcomes using the PRISM
probabilistic model checker.
Finally, to ensure the adversary cannot distinguish a honey host
from a real host, HoneyRoles assumes an ambient network traf-
fic generator to represent the general activity that a given user
may perform [10, 65, 72]. We note that these prior works are sim-
ply examples. Designing and evaluating network traffic genera-
tors that can evade detection from modern machine learning al-
gorithms is an orthogonal challenge. HoneyRoles would directly
benefit from any advancements in this area. However, we note that
in our scenario, the classification must be performed on a compro-
mised switch, which limits the computational capacity of the ad-
versary, thereby limiting which machine learning algorithms can
be used.
4 DESIGN
is section discusses three considerations in the design of Honey-
Roles: (1) honey connections, including how they are managed by
the soware agents and how they are coordinated by the Honey-
Roles controller; (2) dynamic forwarding path management to dis-
tribute honey connections across many potentially compromised
switches and help statistically identify compromised switches; and
(3) the belief maintenance systemwithin the HoneyRoles controller,
which is used to rank switches based on their probability of being
compromised.
4.1 Honey Connections
Honey connections provide the primary form of deception in Hon-
eyRoles. For expository reasons, we describe how to create honey
connections for a single role; it is straightforward to extend the
design to an arbitrary number of roles.
4.1.1 Role Profile. For each role, the administrator defines a
fixed set IDr of real hosts matching their organizational roles. e
administrator defines for each role a honey host factor, α ≥ 0,
which yields the size of the set IDh of honey hosts for the spe-
cific role. Specifically, |IDh | = ⌈α · |IDr |⌉. We expect a typical
deployment will include at least as many honey hosts as real hosts
(α ≥ 1).
HoneyRoles identifies each host (both real and honey) via a 5-
tuple: < ip, mac, type, role, switch >, where ip is the host’s IP
address, mac is the host’s MAC address, type indicates if the host is
real or honey, role specifies the host’s organizational role (e.g., IT
administrator), and switch specifies the network switch to which
the host is aached. e ip, mac, and switch are fixed for real
hosts and are randomly assigned by HoneyRoles for honey hosts.
Of these values, the switch has the most impact on the utility
of honey connections, as it determines where in the network the
honey host exists, and hence the other switches that honey con-
nections to or from this switch will likely traverse. e honey
agent (host) composition and assignment is further discussed in
Section 4.1.2.
Finally, the role profile contains a set of target servers S , each
associated with the organizational role. Conceptually, S defines
the set of servers that users in a role connect with to perform their
duties. For example, for an IT administrator role, S may include
a domain controller, a centralized VM management server, and a
configuration management system server. For each server s ∈ S ,
the network administrator specifies information for valid connec-
tions (e.g., an unprivileged user and associated credentials) so that
the size and frequency of packets in TLS-protected connections are
indistinguishable from the connections generated by real hosts.
4.1.2 Honey Agent. We envision that honey agents will reside
on the same physical hardware as real hosts to reduce capital ex-
penditures required for deploying HoneyRoles. However, network
administrators can deploy hostswithout users, e.g., decommissioned
computers, that run only honey agents.
e honey agent needs to be a privileged process capable of
using distinct IP and MAC addresses. is is achievable using
either operating system virtualization or containerized environ-
ments. For example, bes OS uses a hypervisor to container-
ize multiple distinct execution environments. It provides a flexible
andmodular networking environment that can bridge virtual inter-
faces to different environments. Alternatively, for non-hypervisor
hosts, the honey agent could be deployed as a container. For ex-
ample, Docker can use bridge mode to give a container its own IP
address.
Since our performance evaluation in Section 6 usesMininet [68],
we emulate the existence of a honey agent by creating extraMininet
hosts (with individual IP addresses) tagged as honey hosts. ese
extra honey hosts perform the necessary logic to act as honey
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agents, generating traffic according to assigned role and traffic dis-
tribution.
4.1.3 HoneyAgent Coordination. eHoneyRoles controller co-
ordinates the honey connections sent by honey agents using TLS-
protected heartbeat messages. It is important that heartbeats are
sent on regular intervals and are statistically similar in size, as they
are sent through the data plane and are observable by adversaries.
To preserve the size, the controller can split the necessary informa-
tion across heartbeats or pad a heartbeat to achieve the correct size.
Heartbeat messages are sent to real hosts to prevent the adversary
from using heartbeats to identify honey hosts.
e purpose of the heartbeat messages is to parameterize the
creation of honey connections. To that end, each heartbeat con-
tains the following information: (1) destination information (MAC
address, IP address, transport-layer port), (2) number of RREs (Re-
quest Response Exchange), (3) RRE interval, (4) application-layer
protocol information, and (5) estimated timeout. e generation of
believable honey connections additionally requires realistic application-
layer content or information. e application-layer protocol infor-
mation depends on the type of protocol (e.g., SMTP, IMAP, FTP,
HTTP). For example, HTTP/HTTPS connections may require a
URL, cookies, and username/password pairs. Other application-
level information can beGmail cookies, protocol payloads (i.e., email
bodies), passwords for unencrypted protocols (e.g., SMTP, POP,
IMAP). For simplicity, our implementation considers only HTTP
and HTTPS traffic.
Capturing Real Traffic Profiles: As described in Section 3, a key idea
of HoneyRoles is that honey connections for a given role follow
the traffic paerns of that role. Existing traffic tracing and moni-
toring tools [27, 28, 55] use multiple network sensors distributed
throughout a network. We achieve a similar capability using Open-
Flow’s flow-level statistics collection mechanism [17, 66, 71]. Our
implementation leverages this information within the ONOS SDN
controller. We leverage the OpenFlow control messages (e.g., Pack-
etIn, FlowMod, FlowRemoved, FlowStatistics) to capture the near-
realtime traces of real host connections.
Replicating Real Traffic Profiles: Our implementation does not in-
clude ambient network traffic, but focuses on dynamically turning
captured real traffic profiles into honey connections. e role pro-
file (Section 4.1.1) defines a set of target servers S that are relevant
to the tasks of a given role. HoneyRoles generates honey connec-
tions of a specific role by observing the network connections be-
tween the real hosts IDr of that role and the corresponding servers
in S . As in Harpoon [65], HoneyRoles parameterizes traffic gen-
eration based on the following information for each time interval:
(1) the source and destination addresses; (2) the payload size for each
source-destination pair; (3) the average number of active sessions
between each source-destination pair; (4) the time duration based
on an empirical distribution of time between consecutive connec-
tions as well as the average inter-arrival time; and (5) header infor-
mation based on the distribution of common values such as MAC
address, protocol, and port.
4.1.4 Honey Agent Reports. A honey agent sends reports as
heartbeat responses. Note that real hosts must also send reports
(though without meaningful content) to make them indistinguish-
able from honey hosts. At a high level, a honey agent report pro-
vides a status update on the honey connections specified in previ-
ous heartbeats. Each alert included in a report specifies: (1) total
number of requests sent, and (2) alert details (e.g., average delay,
number of dropped request). Section 4.3 discusses how Honey-
Roles uses reports to statistically identify the locations of compro-
mised switches. Recall that honey connections act as canaries for
the existence of a network adversary. We envision a HoneyRoles
deployment will include a collection of detection types (e.g., packet
rerouting, packet hijacking, manipulation) for different types of ap-
plications (e.g., SMTP, FTP).
Our implementation detects two aack types: SSL-stripping and
blackholing. SSL-stripping occurs when the victim first visits the
HTTP version of a website. Normally, the server will redirect the
web browser to the HTTPS version of the website. However, an
en route network adversary can suppress the redirection to keep
the victim using HTTP URLs, potentially revealing passwords or
other security-sensitive information. To detect SSL-stripping, Hon-
eyRoles uses honey connections that simulate the user entering
just the domain name into the URL bar of the web browser. If the
honey agent does not receive the expected redirect to the HTTPS
version of the web page, an alert is reported.
Network blackholing occurswhen an in-network adversary pre-
vents packets from reaching their destination. For example, an ad-
versary may wish to prevent an IT administrator from accessing a
network logging server while it is performing an aack. To detect
blackholing, HoneyRoles simply sends honey connections to the
important target servers. If a connection exceeds a pre-specified
timeout period, an alert is reported. However, normal network
congestion and load at the target server can also cause honey con-
nections to time-out. erefore, the belief maintenance system
(Section 4.3) must take care when using alerts of this type.
We envision that detection algorithms for other aacks can be
integrated in HoneyRoles, e.g., SSL downgrade, wrong SSL cer-
tificate, page contents modified. However, the SSL-stripping and
blackholing detectors are sufficient to demonstrate how heartbeats
and reports function, because they cover the spectrum of modifi-
cation and dropping.
4.2 Forwarding Path Management
HoneyRoles dynamically changes the forwarding path from clients
to servers to distribute honey connections across potentially com-
promised switches. e dynamic forwarding path helps identify
the location of a compromised switch. Since the goal of the ad-
versary is to distinguish between real and honey connections, it is
important to minimize the differences between them. erefore,
HoneyRoles does not differentiate real connections from honey
connections when changing forwarding paths.
A dynamic forwarding path helps identify the existence of an
adversary more quickly, simply because it distributes packets in
honey connections across more switches. To beer understand
how the dynamically forwarding path helps identify the location
of a compromised switch, consider a collection of alarms raised for
honey connections between client c1 and server s1. If the honey
connections always traverse the same set of network switches, it
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is difficult to determine which switch is compromised. However,
if the forwarding path differs for each alarm, the intersection of
the forwarding paths can be used to isolate a compromised switch.
e belief maintenance system in Section 4.3 uses this intuition,
but considers alarms in the network as a whole.
HoneyRoles builds upon the OpenFlow SDN protocol to per-
form dynamic forwarding paths. A key component of all SDN con-
trollers (e.g., ONOS) is a reactive forwarding path algorithm that
determines the best path from a source to a destination. Network
topologies commonly have redundant links and switches (e.g., see
Figure 1), and this forwarding path algorithm must avoid forward-
ing loops and potentially react to network congestion.
We observe that given a network topology with sufficient re-
dundancy, there will be multiple optimal paths within each pair
of source and destination. Furthermore, the dynamic forwarding
path can include slightly non-optimal forwarding paths as accept-
able. HoneyRoles randomly selects from the set of acceptable for-
warding paths.
More specifically, HoneyRoles’s dynamic path selection oper-
ates as follows. HoneyRoles defines network flows as a 5-tuple:
source IP address (sip ), source transport-layer port (spor t ), destina-
tion IP address (dip ), destination transport-layer port (dpor t ), and
transport-layer protocol (i.e., TCP or UDP). Whenever a new con-
nection (honey or real) is set up by a source-destination pair, a
PacketIn message (request for seing up a forwarding path) is sent
to the controller by the edge switch connectedwith the source host.
HoneyRoles’s reactive forwarding application determines a maxi-
mal set of disjoint paths. Depending on the system requirement,
this application can consider optimal disjoint paths only, or both
optimal and non-optimal disjoint paths, or tolerate a certain per-
centage of overlap. From the set of possible forwarding paths, Hon-
eyRoles selects a path using uniform random distribution. Even if
the defender suspects compromised switches on a certain path, it
should not set a priority in the selection process, as this may be de-
tected by the adversary, thereby revealing some of the defender’s
knowledge.
Given a topology with p disjoint paths (both optimal and non-
optimal), the probability of selecting a certain path is 1/p. At a
given time t , there are r real and h honey connections for a given
target server. If there is a compromised switch in only one dis-
joint path, the probability that the adversary will be able to scan a
real connection is r
p(r+h)
. Consequently, combining the dynamic
forwarding and honey connections, HoneyRoles builds a dense
haystack around the real connections, making passive reconnais-
sance harder.
4.3 Belief Maintenance System
e goal of the belief maintenance system (BMS) is to alert the
system administrator about the existence of an adversary, as well
as potential locations of compromised switches. However, it does
not seek to precisely determine a specific switch or set of switches
that are compromised. Instead, the BMS ranks switches based on
a level of suspiciousness. e goal is to ensure all compromised
switches are among the most suspicious ones in the ranked list.
e BMS can reside on the SDN controller or on a separate server.
Algorithm 1 Belief Maintenance System
1: procedure BeliefMaintenance(t )
2: #Risk update using Honey Notification
3: Reinitialize ak & ck to 0, for all switch sk
4: for each entry e ∈ Honey Notification at time t do
5: Ps,d ← дetForwardinдPath(e)
6: for all k ∈ Ps,d do
7: Increment ck
8: if any ATTACK logged in e then
9: Increment ak
10: for all connected switch sk do
11: Update rk & Rk,t
As discussed in Section 4.1.4, detection of adversarial activity
and alert generation is performed by the honey agents. Recall that
HoneyRoles uses both role-based honey connections and dynamic
forwarding paths to entice the adversary into acting on false infor-
mation. HoneyRoles cannot be certain about the network’s adver-
sarial state. For example, some alarms (e.g., packet dropping) can
be generated from either network failure or adversarial activity.
Furthermore, even for true positives for a given forwarding path
with n switches, there is only a 1n chance that a given switch is
the source of the alarm. erefore, the BMS maintains an updated
mapping between the honey connections and the corresponding
forwarding paths and uses alarms from honey agent reports to up-
date its belief of suspiciousness for each switch.
e BMS updates its current belief for each switch aer each
discrete time interval γ . at is, if the current time is t , the next
update will occur at t +γ . e BMS uses the γ period to collect sta-
tistics for the interval, aer which the reports can be discarded. For
each switch sk , the BMS calculates following for the time interval.
• ak : number of alarms received for forwarding paths that
include switch sk
• ck : number of honey connections forwarded by sk
e BMS then calculates a risk factor rk,t =
ak
ck
for switch k on a
specific time t . It computes an overall risk factor Rk,t for switch
sk using exponential moving average (where Rk,0 = rk,0):
Rk,t = β · rk + (1 − β) · Rk,t−γ (1)
For convergence, 0 < β < 1. To reduce the weight assigned to the
current time interval, for our experiments in Section 5, we use β =
0.2; however, we have experimented with other values of β (≤ 0.5)
and anecdotally found similar results. Algorithm 1 summarizes the
process of belief maintenance.
e BMS creates a ranked list of switches based on their level
of suspiciousness (higher Rk,t means higher likelihood of being
compromised). is list is a useful resource for the network ad-
ministrator for remediation or reconfiguration.
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
HoneyRoles creates deception using honey connections from honey
hosts representing different enterprise roles. In this section, we
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use the PRISM probabilistic model checker to characterize Honey-
Roles’s effectiveness against an adversary that is aware of the ex-
istence of a HoneyRoles deployment. Note that this evaluation as-
sumes HoneyRoles has raised an alarm. e evaluation is designed
to determine how well HoneyRoles can identify the compromised
switch. Recall that our goal is for compromised switches to be
ranked as one of the most suspicious. We begin by presenting our
implementation of HoneyRoles within PRISM and then present the
results of the simulation.
5.1 PRISM Model
Probabilistic model checking uses a model construction that rep-
resents the behavior of a system over time, i.e., the possible states
that the model can be in, the transitions that can occur between
states, and information about the likelihood of these transitions [40].
It can provide an approximate value of a certain parameter by cal-
culating all possible system paths. e PRISM [39] probabilistic
model checker supports three model types: Markov decision pro-
cesses (MDPs), discrete-timeMarkov chains (DTMCs), and continuous-
timeMarkov chains (CTMCs). We chose to use DTMC as it is more
realistic for our model to consider time as discrete steps for main-
taining the belief state of each switch.
A PRISM model is constructed as the parallel composition of its
modules. e behavior of each module is described by a collection
of guarded commands.
[ ] дuard → p1 : u1 + . . . + pn : un ;
Here, the guard дuard is a predicate over model variables. Each up-
date actionui describes a transition themodule canmake by giving
the variables new values; in the case of DTMCs, pi is the transition
probability. If the guard is true, each update is executed accord-
ing to its probability. Modules interact with each other through
synchronizing on identically labeled commands, thus modules can
depend on each other for updates and transitions.
For modeling complex network behavior using PRISM, we de-
veloped a code generator that takes in a configuration and outputs
PRISM models with necessary modules and transition formulas.
e generated model also (1) ensures consistent state updates and
module transitions; (2) identifies compromised switches based on
observations from honey connections; and (3) generates the neces-
sary reward functions to measure the performance of the system.
Our framework generates a dedicated HoneyRoles model for each
configuration. Mathematically, each configuration is defined by
〈E,N ,L,A,D, P〉, as described in Table 1. We define three PRISM
modules: Defender, System and Adversary. e interactions be-
tween these modules is summarized in Figure 2.
5.1.1 DefenderModule. As shown in Figure 2, the defender mod-
ule specifies the current system state by defining a connection
C → 〈type, role, source, destination, path〉. By selecting a new con-
nection configuration, a new transition path is initiated. Listing 1
shows a simplified segment of PRISM code for selecting a new con-
nection configuration.
Both adversarial actions and the system belief update in the
current path depend on the connection configuration. Since we
cannot represent traffic replication in PRISM, we specify the same
probabilistic selectionweight for both the honey and real types. As
Table 1: HoneyRoles Configuration in PRISM
E
Environment Features Value
Number of Roles, Erole 3
Number of Rounds, Erounds 100
Number of connections per round, Elength 100
Type of Topology, Etopology Fat-
Tree [20]
N
Nodes
Network devices or switches, Nswitch 14
Number of real client hosts, Nreal 50
Number of honey client hosts, Nhoney 50
Number of servers, Nserver 6
L
Connectivity
Forwarding paths, Lsrc,dst
Maximum number of redundancy for each pair,
|Lsrc,dst |
8
A
Adversarial Features
Compromised switches, Aswitch {1, 2}
Target role, Arole
Aacker confidence on system, Aconfidence
P
Set of Operational policy
Connection definition, Pconnection
Belief maintenance, Pbelief
Aacker actions, Paacker
Defender 
Module
System 
Module
Adversary 
Module
Compromised 
path
ReInitialize
Belief Update
< type, role, source, 
destination, path >
Connection
< attack decision >
Figure 2: HoneyRoles workflow betweenmodules in PRISM
a result, the model produces a nearly equal number of honey and
real connections over the time.
For this implementation, we have only considered threemission-
oriented roles, each of which is selected with equal probability.
e source and destination are randomly chosen for each connec-
tion, depending on the type of connection and role chosen in pre-
vious states. For this PRISM analysis, we have considered both
disjoint and non-disjoint paths. We are using a uniformly random
distributed forwarding path selection algorithm. Since PRISM can-
not directly encode a network topology, our PRISM code generator
enumerates these different paths between sources and destinations
as distinct PRISM formulas with unique tags.
5.1.2 System Module. e system module gets the current con-
nection C as a configuration. It decides between two possibilities.
If the chosen forwarding path contains at least one compromised
switch, the system state gives control to the Adversary module.
Otherwise, the system state moves towards the defender module
to reinitialize the system.
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Listing 1: Pconnection code snippet
//#type selection #
[] sched =0 & free & flowType =0 -> (flowRatio /100): (flowType '=1) & (sched '=1)
+ (1-flowRatio /100): (flowType '=2) & (sched '=1);
//#role type selection #
[] sched =1 & free -> 1/3: (roleType '=role0) & (sched '=2) + 1/3: (roleType '= role1) & (sched '=2)
+ 1/3: (roleType '=role2) & (sched '=2);
//#source selection #
[] sched =2 & free & sourceID =0 & count <maxIteration & flowType =1 & roleType =role0 ->
1/4: (sourceID '=h1) & (sourceSW '=h1sw) & (sched '= 3)+
... + 1/4: (sourceID '=h10) & (sourceSW '= h10sw) & (sched '= 3);
...
[] sched =2 & free & sourceID =0 & count <maxIteration & flowType =2 & roleType =role2 ->
1/4: (sourceID '=h11) & (sourceSW '=h11sw) & (sched '= 3) +
... + 1/4: (sourceID '=h17) & (sourceSW '= h17sw) & (sched '= 3);
//# destination selection #
[] sched =3 & free & destinationID=0 & roleType =role0 -> 1/2: (destinationID '=h21) & (destinationSW '=h21sw )& (sched '= 4)
+ 1/2: (destinationID '=h24) & (destinationSW '= h24sw )& (sched '= 4);
...
//## current path selection ##
[] sched = 401 & sourceID != 0 & destinationID != 0 -> 1/2 : (currentPath ' = pathNumber0) & (sched '=402)
+ 1/2 : (currentPath ' = pathNumber1) & (sched '=402);
Listing 2: Rk,t update code snippet from Pbelief
// #record honey events#
[ beliefUpdateAttacker] sched =5 & active_defender=true &
(attackFlow=2| attackFlow=3) & (flowType =2) ->
(sched '=6) & (received_size '=0);
...
[] sched =6 & currentPath=3002 -> (ae_sw0 '= ae_sw0 +1) &
(ae_sw4 '=ae_sw4 +1) & (ae_sw1 '= ae_sw1 +1) & (sched '=801);
...
[] (flowType =2) & sched =8 & currentPath=3002 ->
(count_sw0 '= count_sw0 +1) & (count_sw4 '= count_sw4 +1) &
(count_sw1 '= count_sw1 +1) & (sched '=(80001));
...
// #update belief #
[] sched =9 & roundFinished=true ->
(bi_sw0 '=round ((((bi_sw0 /100)*0.80) +
(( ae_sw0 /(count_sw0 ))*0.20))*100)) &
... & (bi_sw7 '= round (((( bi_sw7 /100)*0.80)+
(( ae_sw7 /(count_sw7 ))*0.20))*100)) & (sched '=10);
[] sched =10 & roundFinished=true ->
(count_sw0 '=1) & (ae_sw0 '=1) &
...
(count_sw7 '=1) & (ae_sw7 '=1) & (sched '=11);
Belief Update: Aer the adversarymodule takes actions (Section 5.1.3),
control returns to the system module. For every round r , the sys-
temmodule records the number of honey connections (ck ) handled
by each switch k , as well as the number of adversarial incidents
(ak ). Aer the completion of each round ck and ak are reinitial-
ized.
In our current implementation, each round consists of Elength
connections (see Table 1). When completing one round, our model
goes though approximately Elength × 20 (or × 25) state transitions
and Elength × 3 module transitions. Aer completing a round, the
current belief is calculated as described in Equation 1. Listing 2
shows a simplified segment of PRISM code representing this up-
date. Here, if the current connection type is honey and attack is
true, the adversarial incident count (ak ) of each switch k on the
current path is incremented. Note that this code uses β = 0.2 as
discussed in Section 5.2.
5.1.3 Adversary Module. To simulate reconnaissance, we assume
the adversary receives all possible kinds (different types, roles, IDs)
of connections from the defender that pass through the coorespond-
ing compromised switch. Note that we assume the adversary has
knowledge observed from all compromised switches, if there is
more than one. Ultimately, the goal of HoneyRoles is to defend
against passive reconnaissance by deceiving the adversary with
honey flows. In the context of our model, this means the defender
cannot detect the adversary or update its belief. However, an ad-
versary that is aware of HoneyRoles may still act, performing some
active reconnaissance and aacks once it has gained sufficient con-
fidence through passive reconnaissance. erefore, the adversary
module accumulates confidence in observed information and then
aempts to (1) increase confidence through some active reconnais-
sance, and (2) aack real connections with targeted roles.
As specified in Table 1, the adversary module has a target or-
ganizational role Arole (e.g., IT administrators). We assume the ad-
versary is only interested in traffic for that role, as defined by con-
nections to the role’s corresponding target servers. e module
is also configured with a confidence parameter Aconfidence, which
specifies a threshold of sufficient belief in observed information.
e adversary module has two phases: (1) aack, and (2) build
confidence. For the aack phase, each connection startswith check-
ing whether the current connection as associated withArole. If the
current connection matches Arole, the adversary probabilistically
(based on Aconfidence) determines its belief for the current observa-
tion. If the adversary believes the current observation is real traffic,
it performs an aack. On the other hand, if the adversary believes
the current observation is honey traffic, it does nothing. Listing 3
shows a simplified segment of PRISM code for the adversary mod-
ule.
On the completion of each round, the adversary probabilistically
updates Aconfidence , either increasing or decreasing it. To indicate
that the adversary’s knowledge is increasing with each connection,
our implementation uses a higher weight (e.g., 23 in Listing 3) for
increasing the Aconfidence . To simulate the effect of deception, we
also include the possibility of decreasing confidence (e.g., 13 in List-
ing 3). Finally, we assume the adversary cannot have 100% confi-
dence over its observation. erefore, if Aconfidence ≤ 90, our im-
plementation uses an equal probability of increasing or decreasing
Aconfidence (e.g.,
1
2 in Listing 3). Alternatively, if Aconfidence ≥ 90,
our implementation only allow it to remain same or decrease.
Based on this operation, the adversary’s action for a connec-
tion can be defined by a Markov chain. Let HoneyRoles’s initial
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Listing 3: Paacker code snippet
confidence: int init 10;
[ startAttacker] attacker =0 & active_attacker=true & sched=5 -> (attacker '=1);
[] attacker =1 & active_attacker=true & targetRole=roleType ->
(confidence/100): (beliefObservation '= true) & (attacker '=2)
+(1- confidence/100): (beliefObservation '= false) & (attacker '=2);
[] attacker =2 & active_attacker=true & beliefObservation=true & flowType =1-> (attack '= true) & (attacker '=3);
[] attacker =2 & active_attacker=true & beliefObservation=false & flowType =2->(attack '= true) & (attacker '=3);
[] attacker =2 & active_attacker=true & beliefObservation=false & flowType =1->(attack '= false) & (attacker '=3);
[] attacker =2 & active_attacker=true & beliefObservation=true & flowType =2-> (attack '= false) & (attacker '=3);
...
[] attacker =6 & attackerRoundComplete=true & confidence <90 ->
2/3: (confidence '= confidence+1) & (attacker '=7)
+ 1/3: (confidence '= confidence -1) & (attacker '=7);
[] attacker =6 & attackerRoundComplete=true & confidence >=90 ->
1/2: (attacker '=7)+ 1/2: (confidence '= confidence -1) & (attacker '=7);
[ beliefUpdateAttacker] (attacker =7| attacker =6) & attackFlow!=0 &
active_defender=true & active_attacker=false -> (attacker '=0);
< C0, A0, B0 >
< C1, A0, B0 >< C1, A1, B1 >
< C0, A1, B0 >< C0, A1, B1 >
< C1, A1, B0 >
compromised = true
type = honey
attack = true
compromised = true
type = real
attack = true
compromised 
= false
compromised 
= false
compromised 
= false
compromised = true
type = honey
attack = true
compromised = true
type = real
attack = true
Figure 3: A simplified version of HoneyRoles Markov chain
state be denoted 〈C0,A0,B0〉, where C0 is the current connection
state, A0 is the adversary state in terms of confidence, and B0 in-
dicates system’s belief on the suspiciousness of switches. Figure 3
provides a simplified visualization. e figure assumes only three
possible conditions: (1) compromised defines the state of a forward-
ing path being compromised or not, (2) type defines a connection
to be either honey or real, and (3) attack defines an adversarial at-
tack decision. We assume a connection configuration (e.g., source,
destination, type) can repeat; however, this is infrequent and not
shown in the figure.
5.2 Security Evaluation
is section provides the simulation results from the PRISM mod-
ule described in Section 5.1. However, first we describe our exper-
imental setup and performance metrics.
Experimental Setup: As described in Section 5.1, our code gener-
ator automatically creates a PRISM model given a system config-
uration. e code generator was wrien in around 1,300 lines of
Python code. It has two parts: 1) the TopologyParser generates
the topology by using connectivity information to enumerate all-
possible forwarding paths for each pair of edge switches, 2) the
PRISMCodeGenerator takes the topology information and the sys-
tem parameters (Table 1) and generates final PRISM logic. e “Ex-
periment” column in Table 1 specifies the configuration used for
our experiment. Specifically, we considered scenarios where there
were 1 or 2 compromised switches, including simulations where
the compromised switch resided at different locations within the
Fat-Tree topology (i.e., edge, aggregate, core). Note that we used a
Fat-Tree topology for lack of a public database of an enterprise net-
work topology. Repositories such as Topology-Zoo [57] and Inter-
net2 [13] only include topologies for data centers, ISPs, and point
of presence (POP) networks. However, our code generator can con-
sume topologies in GeographyMarkup Language (GML) following
the format of Topology-Zoo and can therefore be easily used to
evaluate different topologies. Finally, to assess the sensitivity of β
in Equation 1, we ran the simulator with β ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}.
We used the discrete-event simulator built into PRISM, a tech-
nique oen called statistical model checking [2]. is sampling
approach generates a large number of random paths through the
model, evaluating the result of the given properties on each run,
and using this information to generate an approximately correct
result [39]. Each simulation was run for the path length of 200, 000
(approximately 100 rounds) and collected data on each step of 2, 000
(approximately on completion of each round). Each simulation
takes 50 samples and provides the mean values as a final result.
Performance Metrics: Recall that this evaluation is designed to de-
termine how well HoneyRoles can locate the compromised switch
or switches, i.e., how oen the compromised switch(es) appear
high inHoneyRoles’ suspiciousness ranking. We thus examine this
ranking over the course of 100 rounds.
5.2.1 Detection Accuracy with One Compromised Switch. Fig-
ure 4 shows the relative ranking of suspiciousness for switches
for β = 0.2 when there is only one compromised switch. e
other β configurations produced anecdotally similar graphs, but as
hypothesized, a smaller β performs beer. e figure shows that
when there is one compromised switch, that switch is consistently
ranked in the top-1 or top-2.
When comparing the different locations for the compromised
switch (i.e., edge, aggregate, and core), the figure shows the best
performance for compromised switches located at the edge (Fig-
ure 4a). is is because it is easier to isolate the aack activity
over the time. As shown in Figures 4b and 4c, when a core or ag-
gregate switch is compromised, HoneyRoles does not provide as
clear of a distinction. However, this is an artifact of the Fat-Tree
topology, as core and aggregate switches are included in most of
the forwarding paths that raise alarms. Hence, it is difficult to sta-
tistically determine which switch on the path is performing the
aacks. at said, even with this high overlap, the compromised
switches were within the top-2 riskiest at all times.
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(a) One compromised edge switch (b) One compromised aggregate switch (c) One compromised core switch
Figure 4: Confidence in switch compromise for one compromised switch (β = 0.2).
(a) Two compromised edge switches (b) Two compromised aggregate switches (c) Two compromised core switches
(d) One edge and one aggregate compromised
switch
(e) One edge and one core compromised switch
(f) One aggregate and one core compromised
switch
Figure 5: Confidence in switch compromise for two compromised switches (β = 0.2).
5.2.2 Detection Accuracy with Two Compromised Switches. Fig-
ure 5 shows six possible combinations of compromised switches
for β = 0.2. Other than the number of compromised switches, the
other parameters remained the same as in the tests with one com-
promised switch. As before, different β values produced visually
similar results, with smaller β values performing beer.
As discussed in Section 5.2.1, edge switches are easier to isolate
than aggregate and core. When aggregate or core switches are
compromised, at least one of the compromised switches is ranked
in the top one or two most of the time, with the second compro-
mised switch being in the top five for all but two scenarios. Note
that the network administrator can approach refreshing switches
to a good known state in an incremental fashion. at is, it can re-
fresh the top-1 switch, removing one of the compromised switches
and leaving only one, which as shown in Figure 4 is easier to iso-
late. While the adversary will know that it has been detected, in the
worst case (for detection) it will stop aacking connections, which
is ultimately our goal. e system administrators can also define
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some threshold on the switch risk factors, depending on their secu-
rity requirement. us, administrators will remove a switch only
when its risk factor goes beyond that threshold.
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
HoneyRoles’s security stems from its deception elements (e.g., honey
connections and routes), which add network overhead. We now
discuss our prototype implementation, experimental setup, and
evaluateHoneyRoles’s performance overhead in an emulatedMininet [68]
environment.
6.1 Implementation
Our HoneyRoles prototype is implemented as six components that
comprise the design in Section 4. We built our prototype on top of
the OpenJDK 11.0.7 and ONOS 2.0.0 SDN controller with the de-
fault configuration. ree components are implemented as ONOS
Java applications: ForwardingPathManager (95 lines of code), Heart-
beat Generator (305 lines of code), and Traffic Tracer (250 lines
of code). Two additional components run as dedicated processes
that communicate with the ONOS controller: Belief Management
System (180 lines of code) and Honey Connection Processor (310
lines of code). e Mininet network creation and real host traf-
fic generator took up 600 and 120 lines of code, respectively. e
Honey Agent (240 lines of code) is used implementation the work-
flow of a honey host. Although HoneyRoles can function with dif-
ferent applications (e.g., SSH, SMTP), we restricted ourselves to
HTTP/HTTPS traffic.
Real Client 
Hosts
Honey 
Client 
Hosts
Server 
Hosts
Honey 
Connection 
Generator
Belief 
Maintenance 
System
ONOS Controller
Heartbeat 
Generator
Forwarding Path 
Manager 
Traffic 
Tracer
ONOS Default 
Functionalities
Figure 6: Experimental Layout for Evaluation
Network Creation: Our performance analysis uses the same Fat-
Tree topology generation algorithm used for the security analysis
in Section 5. Both Real and Honey client hosts are implemented
as standard Mininet hosts. e Real hosts execute a script that
randomly initiates sessions (a sequence of one or more HTTP re-
quests) with a target server. e Honey hosts execute the Honey
Agent script, which uses heartbeat instructions from the controller
to initiate a session with a target server and then reports results
back to the controller using Honey Notifications. Servers are im-
plemented as Docker containers running on the host machine. To
enable SSH and ping traffic between the servers and Mininet, we
Figure 7: Percent Overhead of HTTP request completion
time in each configuration compared to baseline.
created a virtual node in the root network namespace and then cre-
ated a link between this node and one of the core switches in the
Mininet topology.
6.2 Experimental Setup
e evaluation was hosted in a virtual machine configured with 8
vCPUs and 32 GB RAM, running on a VMware ESXi 6.5.0 host with
Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPUE5620@2.40GHz processors. Figure 6 shows
the network, along with the main components described in the
implementation details (Section 6.1). We considered four environ-
ments to compare the performance impact of various HoneyRoles
components. e Baseline environment was configured to use the
default ONOS seings with no HoneyRoles features enabled and
included only real hosts in the network. e Honey Forwarding
environment replaces the default ONOS reactive forwarding appli-
cation with the HoneyRoles Forwarding application but does not
introduce honey hosts or honey agents. e Honey Host environ-
ment was configured with the default ONOS forwarding app but
introduces the Heartbeat Generation Application and honey hosts.
Here, we have one honey host initiated in correspond to each real
host in the network. Finally, the HoneyRoles environment was
configured with all HoneyRoles features enabled and one honey
host for each real host in the network.
To maintain consistency with our security analysis, we config-
ured each environment with 50 real hosts. As discussed easier
in Section 4, we are using a 5-tuple for flow rule matching: sip ,
spor t , dip , dpor t , and protocol . e baseline and all treatments use
ONOS’s default 10 second idle timeout for flow-mod rules. Each
experiment ran for 30 minutes and all hosts (honey or real) were
configured to send 1 request per second to a specific server, which
is selected based on their roles from a fixed set. is network load
represented a moderately loaded network, as introducing honey
connections at peak capacity would clearly have a significant over-
head. We assume enterprise networks rarely operate at a peak ca-
pacity for prolonged durations. roughout the experiment, the
request completion time was recorded for every request between
unique real-client and server pairs.
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6.3 HoneyRoles Performance Overhead
Calculating a single average overhead across all pairs does not pro-
vide a useful characterization, as different pairs have different num-
bers of hops between them, resulting in a significant variance in
completion time. erefore, to observe the overhead HoneyRoles
imposes on real network traffic, we calculated the average request
completion time between each unique real-client server pair for
the baseline environment. For each non-baseline environment, we
calculated the percent overhead of every real request from the base-
line average. We ploed the percent overheads for each configura-
tion as a cumulative distribution function (CDF).
Figure 7 depicts the overhead of each treatment with respect to
the baseline. Each line represents the percentage of real requests
in each environment that finished under a given percent overhead
calculated using the average baseline request completion time for
unique client-server pairs. at is, each request between client c
and server s in the Honey Forwarding Application, Honey Host,
and HoneyRoles environments was compared to the average com-
pletion time of all requests between c and s in the baseline envi-
ronment. From this graph we observe that for HoneyRoles, 90% of
requests finish with less than 14% overhead when compared to the
baseline.
Note that these percentage overheads are for small request-completion
times, which are significantly impacted by jier. e median re-
quest completion time in the baseline environment was 31 ms. As
a result, even small changes in completion time in the other envi-
ronments show as a larger magnitude overhead. For example, with
a 31 ms baseline completion time, a request with a 9 ms increase
from the baseline (e.g., 40 ms) results in a 29% overhead. e natu-
ral jier in network requests and the sensitivity when dealing with
small numbers can also explain the negative overheads observed
in Figure 7.
Further, we compared the average request-completion time of
each environment to the baseline average by calculating the effect
size using Cohen’s d. Cohen’s d reports how many pooled stan-
dard deviations two groups differ by. According to Cohen [21], a
d value of 0.20 is considered a “small” effect, a d value of 0.50 is
a “medium” effect, and a d value of 0.80 is a “large” effect of an
experimental change to a control group. For the HoneyRoles envi-
ronment, we observe 55% of client-server pairs have a d value of
under 0.20 (small effect), and all of d values are below 0.63, which
is well below the 0.80 margin (large effect). Although, Cohen does
not describe how to interpret d values just above a threshold, we
found that 90% of client-server pairs have a d value under 0.26,
which we consider to still be relatively small. us we observe
that, with respect to request-completion times, HoneyRoles had a
small effect for a majority of the client-server pairs and a medium
effect for all the rest.
We believe our small overheads are due to two primary reasons.
First, the network is not under full load, thus the introduction of
Honey Host traffic does not compete with real traffic for resources
and has minimal impact on the network links and server process-
ing. Second, although the Honey Forwarding application may se-
lect non-optimal routes for traffic, for the choice of Fat-Tree the
non-optimal routes do not introduce major differences in request
completion time. It may be possible that a network is designed in
such a way that a non-optimal route may introduce much higher
round trip times but these routes are not permanent and some traf-
fic will still travel over optimal or close to optimal routes. If this is
observed it practice, network administrators can create additional
network links to provide shorter alternative paths.
7 DISCUSSION
Aack variations: HoneyRoles considers that an adversary uses
passive and active reconnaissance to obtain knowledge about tar-
get enterprise roles, presumably to launch active aacks using that
knowledge. Many active aacks and reconnaissance techniques
have been discovered over the past decades. Although we illus-
trate HoneyRoles with SSL-stripping and blackholing aacks, it
is possible to adapt to other types of aack though implementing
respective detection algorithms in honey agents. For example, con-
sider the use of probing messages during active reconnaissance to
get a response from target hosts. In this case, it is possible incor-
porate unexpected connections to the IP addresses of honey hosts.
Accuracy vs. deception: Using the centralized control of SDN, it
is possible to dynamically change honey components according
to system belief to improve accuracy. e HoneyRoles forwarding
pathmanager could routemost real connections through less risky
switches and honey connections through more risky switches in
order to beer identify the compromised switch. However, such
an approach would be risky. First, sudden changes in system be-
havior may alarm the adversary and reduce the effectiveness of
the deception (e.g., helping it identify which IP address belong to
honey hosts). Second, a dynamic change in system behavior may
increase complexity in large networks. ird, the TCB must in-
clude at least a segment of switches to achieve the security goal.
Scope of implementation: We used PRISM to evaluate the security
of HoneyRoles and used an emulatedMininet environment tomea-
sure performance overhead. ese evaluation frameworks are ap-
proximations of realistic enterprise networks. Our security evalu-
ation was limited in the way it modeled aacker behavior, as we
could not find any realistic aack data for enterprise reconnais-
sance. Absent realistic aack behavior, the PRISMmodel wasmore
comprehensive than a Mininet simulation to estimate detection ac-
curacy. Additionally, we were unable to find realistic enterprise
network topologies and relied on the Fat-Tree topology as a repre-
sentative topology with redundant links and switches.
Finally, as stated in Section 3, we assume the existence of an
ambient network traffic generator [10, 65, 72], which our imple-
mentation does not include. Additional work is required to design
and evaluate ambient network traffic generators against more re-
cent machine learning algorithms; however, doing so is orthogo-
nal to the contributions of this paper. Any viable traffic generator
could be easily incorporated into HoneyRoles. We also note that
some machine learning algorithms require significant storage and
computational capabilities, which are not available to an adversary
positioned on a compromised packet forwarding device.
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8 RELATED WORK
Network reconnaissance and eavesdropping: Traditional intrusion
detection systems cannot detect passive aackers performing net-
work reconnaissance from compromised packet forwarding devices.
Such reconnaissance investments are particularly apropos to ad-
vanced persistent threats (APTs) [15]. Aer gaining a foothold in
a network by compromising a device, adversaries can leverage in-
formation through reconnaissance to beer identify targets and
vulnerable devices. Bartle et al. [8] demonstrate the dangers of
reconnaissance by presenting a quantitative comparison and evalu-
ation of the effectiveness of passive monitoring and active probing
for service discovery in decentralized networks.
Even if traffic is encrypted, reconnaissance remains a threat.
Schuster et al. [62], Backes et al. [7], and Ling et al. [44] show that
encrypted web traffic can leak information through packet length,
packet timing, web flow size, and response delay. Similarly, App-
Print [50] analyzes the possibility of fingerprinting mobile apps via
comprehensive traffic observations. Anderson et al. [4] have pro-
duced TLS fingerprint from network data, revealing the details of
TLS versions and other configuration parameters. With increasing
threats of targeted reconnaissance and aacks (e.g., Snowden [64],
CISCOSYNfulKnock [31], political espionage [42]), defense against
APT is becoming more critical.
Deceptive Defenses: Deception techniques provide alternative de-
fense approach that can mislead and delay adversarial efforts, and
even detect aacks in early stages. Whaley et al. [74] define decep-
tion as the misperception that is intentionally induced by other en-
tities. Spafford et al. [3] extend this definition of cyber-deception
as “planned actions taken to mislead and/or confuse aackers and
to thereby cause them to take (or not take) specific actions that
aid computer-security defenses.” Current deceptive defense tech-
niques primarily use amoving target defense (MTD) approach. ese
solutions depend on mimicking random or static specification of
system behavior, network configuration, or network infrastructures
(e.g., honeypots, honey-nets) [32, 33, 61, 77]. Dynamically gener-
ated decoy traffic [11], decoy based IP randomization [19], and de-
coy vulnerability-based honey traffic [5] has reported to be more
effective.
e dynamic control and programmability of an SDN environ-
ment has inspired new deception techniques. HoneyMix [30] uses
a dynamic SDN-based honey-net to automate interactions with ad-
versaries, and showed deception is a promising approach toward
defending against network reconnaissance. Further, the dynamic
network configuration of an SDN can be used for discriminating
against scanning aacks and enhancing targeted defenses [5, 47].
For example, Achleitner et al. [1] use SDN to defend against in-
sider reconnaissance by simulating virtual network topologies as
decoys.
Soware Defined Networking: SDNs have the potential to address
many operational and security challenges in large enterprise net-
works [41, 45]. ey decouple network control from the underly-
ing data plane and consolidates configuration to a logically cen-
tral controller, which provides valuable flexibility for programmat-
ically and dynamically reconfiguring traffic forwarding [48]. SDN
has the potential to supplant conventional security systems [76],
simplify policy enforcement [29, 60], ensure information flow con-
trol [56], enable deceptive defense [52], and provide a soware
defined perimeter [22, 54]. However, the greater capabilities and
open functionality of SDN switches increase the potential for com-
promise and enable a new vantage point for aacks, e.g., data plane
aacks using advanced reconnaissance, data manipulation, and
redirection (e.g., Teleportation [69], Benton et al. [9], Menghao et
al. [78], Know Your Enemy [23]).
Network analysis and auditing tools (e.g., Header Space Analy-
sis [34], VeriFlow [35], SDN-RDCD [79]) can protect against net-
work or SDN controller configuration failures (or aacks). How-
ever, a compromised SDN data plane can introduce different types
of aack scenarios [6], which are not possible to detect through
header flow analysis alone. Some solutions have sought to detect
forwarding aacks by monitoring flow statistics from neighboring
switches [55], verifying OpenFlow events in the controller [73, 78],
applying heavy-weight cryptographic approaches [36], and naive
controller generated probes [14, 16].
Sphinx [25] uses SDN control messages for incremental valida-
tion of network updates and detect suspicious behaviors (e.g., DoS,
blackholing, fake topology). WedgeTail [63] detects both forward-
ing aacks and forged packets by utilizing Header Space Anal-
ysis and other network troubleshooting tools. Both Sphinx and
WedgeTail dynamically construct network flow graphs to compare
with a defined policy to identify deviations, which is not only a
manual and error-prone process but also cannot handle dynamic
networks. Additionally, DynaPFV [43] proposed a mechanism to
detect packet-modification by comparing the cryptographic hash
of packets at the ingress and egress points of a network. However,
none of these prior works can address passive (or even subtle ac-
tive) reconnaissance. Since reconnaissance can be performedwith-
out network disruption aacks (e.g., forwarding, packet forging,
and packet-modification aacks detected by the tools above), the
aacker is able to evade the defenses of prior works. HoneyRoles
complements the detection capabilities of prior works by adding a
layer of deception to lower the effectiveness of reconnaissance in
the network.
9 CONCLUSION
e increasing complexity of packet forwarding devices such as
routers and switches make them a new target for advanced per-
sistent threats. From the vantage point of a compromised packet
forwarding device, an adversary can passively monitor network
traffic to identify not only the network topology and servers listen-
ing on ports, but also the client hosts that connect to high-value
servers such as domain controllers and financial systems. In this
paper, we presented HoneyRoles as a novel approach to defending
against this relatively new threat. HoneyRoles uses honey con-
nections to both deceive adversaries and dissuade them from per-
forming aacks. A key idea behind HoneyRoles is to focus on
client hosts performing high-value organizational roles, building
metaphorical haystacks around their network traffic. e honey
connections used to build these haystacks also act as network ca-
naries to bait adversaries and more quickly detect their presence.
We built a prototype of HoneyRoles in an SDN environment and
modeled its operation using the PRISM probabilistic model checker.
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In doing so, we found thatHoneyRoles reliably ranks compromised
switches among the most suspicious while having only a small ef-
fect on network request completion time. As such, we believe role-
based network deception is a promising approach for defending
against adversaries that have compromised network devices.
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